论文题目：Who marries whom in a surging housing market?
论文摘要：This paper investigates the impact of a surging housing market on marital sorting. To cover the increasingly large down payments required in China today, both spouses’ parents have to hand over their resources to support the couple in purchasing a new home. The incentive to extend credit to make a down payment motivates individuals to “marry up,” and, therefore, predicts an equilibrium of positive assortative matching by parental wealth. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that for husbands, when the down payment doubles, one more year of paternal schooling predicts a marriage in which the father-in-law’s schooling is 0.060 year greater than in a scenario in which the down payment does not increase. Despite increasing social stratification, we find that a divorce reform, which award assets proportionate to the shares of the initial down payment (rather than awarding equal shares) upon divorce, can alleviate marital sorting.
报告人简介：孙昂，经济学博士，毕业于美国布朗大学经济系。自2018年1月起任职于中国人民大学汉青经济与金融研究院，副教授，主持国家自然科学基金（青年）项目。主要研究领域包括行为发展经济学、劳动经济学、人力资本、健康和老龄化等。文章发表于Journal of Development Economics, Demography, Management Science等国际期刊。国际任职包括斯坦福大学的人口与健康老龄化中心(CDEHA)，以及为众多国际经济学、人口学刊物担任匿名评审。